Information Warfare has to offer. As the United States military becomes increasingly reliant on the rapid and accurate flow of information, will the underlying infrastructure and deterrence effort provide sufficient security to ward off potentially devastating Information Warfare attacks?
Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a methodology to identify hazard severity and probability from which to draw reasonable measures to reduce risk. ORM techniques can be adopted to assess Information Warfare (defense) hazards and assist in developing controls to minimize risks. Recommendations highlight the importance of educating personnel in Information Warfare, incorporating Information Warfare (Defense) in war games, studying information infrastructure issues and applying ORM principles to reduce vulnerabilities. warrior who has information superiority will triumph over an adversary, or might information superiority also become a double edged sword --proficient at inflicting devastating injury not only on the enemy but also on those who wield the sword?
BACKGROUND

Information Superiority
Joint Vision 2010 and Concept for Future Joint Operations Expanding Joint Vision 2010 were created to"... provide a conceptual framework for America's armed forces to think about the future." 3 One of the critical precepts of Joint Vision 2010 is the development of Information Superiority.
We must have Information Superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Information Superiority will require both offensive and defensive Information Warfare (IW). 4 Joint Vision 2010 continues in its discussion of various methods of utilizing offensive Information Warfare against an adversary, and then cautions: "...our effort 1 to achieve and maintain Information Superiority will also invite resourceful enemy attacks on our information systems. Defensive Information Warfare to protect our ability to conduct information operations will be one of our biggest challenges in the period ahead." Although the definition of Information Warfare is subject to change, it is broadly defined as:
Actions taken to achieve Information Superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks.
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Methods are being examined to utilize Information Warfare against an adversary, but those same concepts can be used offensively on the United States. 13 There is also currently very little guidance in international law that specifically addresses Information Warfare. In seeking consensus on rules to govern various aspects of information, including Information Warfare, there is a large gap between the rapid growth of information infrastructure as compared to the slow enactment of law.
Law and Infrastructure
Criminal law, international law, and the law of armed conflict especially have not kept pace with the rapid escalation of innovation in the "Information Age". Can attacks on information be considered warfare? Will Information Warfare satisfy international requirements of applying force only under just cause, with right intentions, directed by a legitimate authority, and meet the tests that the application of force is reasonably expected to produce success, for the purpose of good, be taken only as a last resort, and taken with the expectation that peace will be the outcome? Additionally the United Nations Charter requires that the use of force should only be invoked in self-defense. M Will a terrorist group or potential enemy pause to contemplate these tests before launching an information assault designed to disrupt the national security of the United States?
Along with these issues is the fact that much of the military's information there is a considerable amount of overlapping and interdependencies. Spanning 135 countries and over 9.5 million computers the DoD is now just one of many customers on the Internet, and definitely not in control. 17 Because of the ambiguity of laws and the diffusion of responsibility for managing the nation's information infrastructure, it is difficult to develop defense/deterrence strategies and response options to protect critical information infrastructures. 18 The Defense Science Board highlighted the problems of the nation's infrastructure in its 1996 report:
Information infrastructures are vulnerable to attack. While this in itself poses a national security threat, the linkage between information systems and traditional critical infrastructures has increased the scope and potential of the Information Warfare threat. For economic reasons, increasing deregulation and competition create an increased reliance on information systems to operate, maintain, and monitor critical infrastructures. This in turn creates a tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict.
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Paradigm Paralysis
Additionally, Information Warfare is so new and unexplored it does not fit general paradigms of warfare, and therefore people tend to be reluctant to view Information Warfare as a threat or comprehend the disruption of which it is capable.
Information Warfare does not shoot and kill people outright, but it has the potential to disrupt information and communication systems that are critical to military operations. This reluctance alone is a problem because in general, people do not sufficiently prepare for a threat that is considered unlikely --especially undertime or resource constraints. An everyday example involves the use of seat belts based on perceived risks. Some people who religiously buckle their seat belts for long highway trips fail to do so on short hurried trips to the neighborhood store. The rationale is that the risk is not high for a short, low speed trip. In reality, accidents can occur on the shorter trip and could be just as deadly without the seat belt.
After the end of the Cold War, military forces and budgets were downsized, which forced reassessments of how to safeguard national interests and simultaneously develop methods to drive down costs in order to "cash in" on the "peace dividend".
Cost Savings Versus Security
One of the methods to drive down costs was to take advantage of Once again, if the perception is that the risk is low, then precautions may not be implemented.
Chance and Risk
War is the realm of chance. The lifeboat davits on the Titanic were new and since the crew was unfamiliar with the new davits they lost precious time in launching the boats. (If not properly trained in identifying and reporting an intrusion, valuable time will be lost in dealing with intrusions or an outright information attack.)
When it was realized that the ship would sink within one to two hours, there was no established plan to evacuate the ship and prioritize the limited number of lifeboat seats. About 495 seats were left vacant and only 705 people were saved .
(With the rapid proliferation of newly developed information systems, do these systems have realistic contingency plans and priorities when the systems fail, or suffer an attack, especially if the system has extensive interdependences on other government or private industry systems? For operational commanders^ plan may not exist to prioritize which functions are critical to military operations once dependent information systems or infrastructure fails. "During crises, the demand for information will increase; the infrastructure capacity will decrease. There is no mechanism in place to determine the priority of information requirements and allocate diminishing infrastructure capacity during such a crisis." 25 ) Another problem that arose was the mind set that since the Titanic was a large new ship and touted as being unsinkable, why should anyone entrust his or her life to a small boat being lowered to the ocean, about half-way across the Atlantic, after midnight? Some stayed with the Titanic because it gave the illusion of being "safer". (Will operational commanders, subordinate commanders or staff personnel make a similar mistake in judgment? "The information we received must be true, that system has always been a reliable source and it is such a large, complex, and secure network why should we question the veracity of that information?" Could the information be disinformation inserted by a clever infiltration designed to deceive the operational commander's decisions on where to deploy forces?)
The analogy of the Titanic compared to the information infrastructure and the military's dependency on that infrastructure was used to illustrate that even though an event is unlikely, it could have profound repercussions if it does occur.
Unfortunately in the case of the Titanic, it did occur with a devastating loss of life.
The name Titanic became synonymous with tragedy and the arrogance that technology will overcome all obstacles. After the Titanic, laws were enacted to lessen maritime risks. The lesson of placing too much trust in technology is evident, but will we heed the "ice warnings" or do we need to experience the collision before we have the opportunity to make a course correction?
Risk Assessment
According to insurance assessments, the risk for total loss of a ship due to collision with an iceberg is a one-in-a-million, probability.
x The fact that the probability was low lulled decision makers into seeing no value in expending money on additional lifeboats. But not fully considered was an assessment of the level of severity if the event did occur. Given that the probability was low, the conclusion was reached that extra lifeboats were not a cost effective item. If the logic were applied that even though the probability was low (that the ship would sink) but if the event did occur the severity would be high (loss of thousands of lives), it would then be reasonable to expend at least some money for extra lifeboats. Risk can be better managed when both the mishap probability and hazard severity are taken into consideration. In this case the balance between cost and benefit would point to the fact that at a small cost of a few more lifeboats more people could be saved // the event occurred.
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM)
The Titanic example highlights two of the elements of Operational Risk Management: mishap probability and hazard severity. Operational Risk Management is a methodology to manage risk by identifying hazards and providing reasonable measures to reduce risk. Risk management "...is usually highly reactive. We tend to identify only those hazards which have caused problems in the past." 27 (As was the case with Captain Smith of the Titanic, a onein-a-million event that has not been personally experienced may not appear obvious.) ORM is a proactive process in that it identifies past hazards and offers a way to visualize and control threats that may not have been considered. The five steps of ORM are: M) Identify Hazards: Visualize events and identify problems.
(2) Assess Hazards: Identify which hazards present the greatest risks.
Determine the probability the hazard will occur. 
Information Warfare Scenario
A nation hostile to the U.S. contracts a group of computer specialists from another country to design a program to disable and disrupt personal computers in the U.S. military. The ploy is to offer a game that features a war between the originating country and the United States. The game is placed on the Internet as freeware with options to play against others or against the comDuter. Because the game offers realistic scenarios against a real foe, the game takes on an unprecedented popularity with military personnel. People are competing to see 13 who can defeat the enemy, win the most points in the game, and have their name "immortalized" on the Internet scoreboard (if only for a few days). Even though rules prohibit games on military computers, the game is played on military computers. The game is thought to be harmless (no viruses are associated with it, so far) and the game is unofficially encouraged because it develops a keen sense of competition, boosts morale, and sharpens the troop's skills while they are preparing for the real confrontation with the adversary.
In reality though the "game" is a vehicle to "addict" as many personnel as possible into playing the game on military computers with the aim to eventually load a time bomb virus to "explode" on a specified day. As an extra benefit to the adversary nation, whenever an individual plays the game, logs on to retrieve a new version of the game, or logs on to brag about obtaining a high score; the adversary learns a little bit more about the way the United States might operate in a real confrontation. The enemy is using the game as a "war game simulation" to collect data on the courses of action the United States most likely will take. In some cases personnel opt to play the adversary and provide valuable insight on how to defeat the United States. Based on a survey that individuals must answer prior to playing the game, the adversary estimates, that 85 percent of military personnel in theater, or expected to be involved in the operation, have loaded the "game" on a desk top military computer.
When it becomes clear that an actual skirmish is imminent, a time bomb virus is placed in the next version on the Internet where it is unwittingly downloaded by those eager to try the newest version. The time bomb is set to detonate a day before the adversary will launch a massive conventional assault against U.S. forces. The time bomb virus will render computers it infects useless until an uninfected operating system and applications are loaded.
• Given the scenario is an example of an event that could occur in the future, how might it be assessed for potential risks and what controls can be implemented to better manage those risks?
Scenario Risk Assessment
In using scenarios, it is helpful to look at the worst case possibilities. There are two potential hazards in the example:
(1) Computer disruption. Widespread desk top computer disruption will occur at a critical time.
(2) Data/Intelligence disclosed. Data is provided (unwittingly) to the enemy that can be synthesized into intelligence of U.S. strengths, weaknesses, and possible courses of actions.
In assessing the two problems the following questions need to be considered: Without statistical data, some of the answers are subjective. The key is to not stop the process at the first question of probability because the hazard is thought to be "impossible". A Risk Assessment Matrix can aid in assessing the potential risks. A numerical Risk Assessment Code (RAC) from one to seven is defined by the two elements of Hazard Severity (vertical axis) and the Mishap Probability (horizontal axis). Risk control priorities are then derived from the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) in the matrix. Through discussions with staff personnel, including computer and intelligence specialists, it is assessed that for the computer disruption issue, the Mishap Probability is "High" and the Hazard Severity is" Medium" which would
give an (RAC) of 3 , a Moderate Risk, according to the RAC legend in Figure 1 . While the activities discussed in the scenario might occur and cause potential disruptions at the operational level, there may also be disruptions that can occur at a strategic level.
An Additional Dilemma
To add to the complexity of the scenario, "what if" it is December 1999 and the 'year 2000 issue' which is predicted to pose problems on mainframe based government and civilian systems, actually does cause some instability. (The premise is that legacy mainframe based systems that use two digit dates i.e., "97"
and require a conditional logic statement such as : 'if year XX , is greater than year YY, then do a certain routine'. The problem is the year 2000 will be represented as "00" and will be less than, rather than greater than "98".) Many of these old systems were programmed in COBOL, or other languages which programmers are no longer proficient in, thus presenting a challenge to make Warfare is seen as a viable instrument that can serve either side of the conflict.
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS
Joint Vision 2010 provides the focus of Information Superiority as a desirable goal but much effort is required to ensure security of information systems
